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Berle and Corporation Finance:  
Everything Old Is New Again 
Frank Partnoy* 
In this essay, I want to illustrate how Adolf A. Berle Jr.’s Studies in 
the Law of Corporation Finance1 was prescient about the kinds of 
financial innovation that are central to today’s markets. For scholars who 
are not familiar with this publication, Corporation Finance is a 
compilation of edited versions of several of Berle’s articles, along with 
some new material, most of which is focused on 1920s corporate practice. 
My primary goal here is simply to shine a light on this work and to 
memorialize for scholars the key passages that echo many of today’s 
challenges. The punch line of this essay is straightforward: everything old 
is new again. 
The overarching theme of Corporation Finance is that corporate law 
should (and did) depend on context and relationships. Accordingly, Berle 
focused on describing various cutting-edge aspects of corporate practice, 
many of which are strikingly similar to innovative financial practices 
today. My main job in this essay is one of curator. First, I culled from 
Corporation Finance various excerpts that I see as especially interesting 
or resonant. Then I grouped them into categories I think should resonate 
with scholars today. The categories are as follows: 
1. Emphasis of Private Ordering Over Law 
2. Increased Focus on History 
3. Questioning Modern Corporate Objectives 
4. Separation of Ownership from Ownership 
5. Innovation in Financial Instruments 
6. Anonymous Trading Challenges 
7. Emergence of Non-Voting Stock 
8. Increased Importance of Subsidiaries 
                                                     
* Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law. I am grateful for comments from Laura Adams, Bill 
Bratton, Brian Cheffins, Jill Fisch, Shaun Martin, Chuck O’Kelley, Elizabeth Pollman, Robert 
Thompson, and Harwell Wells. 
 1. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928). 
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Each of these categories is important to corporate law scholarship 
today. For scholars who might not have the time to read through the 
entirety of Corporation Finance, the quotes amassed here provide a 
window into Berle’s thinking at the time. The problems he confronted 
nearly a century ago are strikingly similar to the ones we confront today. I 
hope scholars and students of history will find these curated excerpts 
useful and interesting. 
1. EMPHASIS OF PRIVATE ORDERING OVER LAW 
First, and perhaps most fundamentally, Berle noted the importance 
of private norms to the understanding of corporate law. His focus was on 
the actions of lawyers, bankers, and managers rather than the rulings of 
courts. Because financial practice at the time was so far ahead of 
policymakers, Berle argued that private ordering often mattered more than 
legal rulings.2 
The three quotes below illustrate Berle’s emphasis on actual 
transactions. He focuses on the relationships among bankers and 
managers—and their lawyers—and emphasizes that there are unlikely to 
be legal precedents that apply to new forms of relationships and deals. This 
philosophical approach is essentially modern, and easily could apply 
today. 
Corporation law as traditionally taught and written about has 
concerned itself principally with questions affecting the creation, the 
delimitation and the method of action of the corporate 
entity. . . . Today, with the growth of American business, the 
concentration into large financial units, and the increased liberality 
of incorporation statutes, the center of interest has shifted. The 
problems now revolve about financial relationships between the 
various participants in the corporate enterprise.3 
Corporate transactions and financial methods are invariably some 
years ahead of court interpretations. Further, precedents having the 
                                                     
 2. Many scholars have noted the importance of private ordering as compared to legal rulings, 
including in the business arena. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the 
Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329 (2010); Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: 
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Barak D. 
Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private 
Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the 
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How 
We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
673, 682–83 (2005). 
 3. BERLE, supra note 1, at v. 
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force of judicial decisions are common in corporate matters even 
though there is no judicial ruling.4 
Again, bankers and corporate managements habitually must settle, 
generally with the advice of lawyers, the ever-increasing range of 
problems arising out of new forms of securities and contracts, many 
of which involve new relations between the banker, the corporate 
management and one or more classes of security holders. Precedents 
here simply do not exist.5 
2. INCREASED FOCUS ON HISTORY 
In addition to being a lawyer focused on evolving business practices, 
Berle also was a historian. He emphasized the importance of 
understanding the extent of the role of the state in corporations generally. 
Just as the analysis of history plays an increasingly important role in 
modern scholarship, particularly in thinking about corporate constitutional 
law and the role of the corporation in society,6 Berle focused his 
scholarship on the history of the corporate idea, starting with Roman law. 
One of the classic issues from history, then and now, has been the question 
of whether to emphasize the separate existence of the corporate fiction 
versus the inherently corporate notion of the grouping of individuals. This 
distinction is crucial to the interpretation of various corporate rights and 
obligations.7 
Berle emphasized several historical topics including: the limited role 
of the state in early Roman “universities,” the developments associated 
with the East India Company during the sixteenth century, and the 
appearance of the South Sea Company in 1711. He chastised American 
lawyers for foolishly adopting some British ideas, including the notion that 
corporations arose only when British royalty granted charters. He also 
included descriptions of several of the earliest corporations, including 
“The Philadelphia Contributorship,” described below, which was founded 
by Benjamin Franklin and still exists at 212 South 4th Street, between 
Walnut and Locust Streets in the Society Hill neighborhood of 
Philadelphia.8 
                                                     
 4. Id. at vi. 
 5. Id. at vii. 
 6. This volume of articles is perhaps the best and most recent example. For other recent 
examples, see also ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON 
THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS (2018); Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. 
REV. 639 (2016). 
 7. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: 
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135 (2012) (discussing the literature). 
 8. See generally THE PHILADELPHIA CONTRIBUTORSHIP, https://1752.com/ [https://perma.cc/ 
6H9E-X2U3]. 
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This tendency is not new but old; and the historical analysis of the 
development of corporations will perhaps show that the bankers and 
business men are endeavoring to deal with the first principles of 
corporation law, whereas the lawyers have gone off on a tangent 
unhappily introduced into common law during a disreputable period 
of disorder under the Stuart dynasty in England.9 
There seem to have been corporations under the late Roman 
Republic. They were not made by the state, and the state had nothing 
to do with them. . . . A famous instance of such a corporation was the 
University of the Vestal Virgins, who appear to have held title in 
perpetual succession to the property owned by the temple in which 
they served.10 
The corporations mentioned up to this time evidenced the 
participation of the associates, not through a certificate representing 
a property right, or indeed by any measure of property, but through 
membership. And while participation might and in some cases did 
differ, the norm was an equal participation by everyone connected 
with the institution.11 
The idea of using the corporate form as a means of securing financial 
contributions does not appear until the reign of Queen Elizabeth.12 
Corporations now could be formed by merchant adventurers, could 
receive their charter from the king (suitable arrangements having 
been made with him) and could have as an outstanding feature the 
immediate issue of stock.13 
The earliest is probably the New York company “for Settling a 
Fishery,” created in 1685 with share capital. . . . The fifth such 
corporation was the “Philadelphia Contributionship for the Insuring 
of Houses from Loss by Fire”—a share capital insurance company 
which, by the way, is still in existence.14 
But American lawyers were not as familiar with England’s legal 
history then as they are now; with the result that the doctrine of 
corporations as mystical entities created by governmental fiat was 
regarded as somehow inherent in the general scheme of things.15 
Nothing is better settled under the continental law than that when two 
or more men join in a common enterprise, they form an entity distinct 
                                                     
 9. BERLE, supra note 1, at 3. 
 10. Id. at 3. 
 11. Id. at 11–12. 
 12. Id. at 12. 
 13. Id. at 14. 
 14. Id. at 15–16. 
 15. Id. at 17. 
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from any of the individuals concerned. They do this by contract; the 
state has nothing to do with it.16 
On the one hand in England a governmentally created corporation is 
recognized as a frame for its stockholders; on the other, in America, 
an aggregate without the governmental frame is nevertheless 
recognized for some purposes as a corporate entity. So has the circle 
come to complete itself.17 
The tendency suggests only one historical parallel. This is the 
transition which occurred in the early Middle Ages from private 
ownership of land (land then being the chief field in which capital 
could be invested) toward feudal control.18 
3. QUESTIONING MODERN CORPORATE OBJECTIVES 
Berle’s discussion of corporate objectives easily could have been 
teleported from modern discussions of the role of the corporation in 
society and vice versa.19 His references to General Electric and 
stakeholders read as if they were taken from the widely cited 2018 letter 
about corporate objectives from BlackRock, the large institutional 
investor.20 Berle’s questions about corporate objectives were connected 
more to his thoughts about private ordering than to any notions of social 
policy. He emphasized the nature of the relationships among various 
corporate actors as the source of questions about corporate objectives. 
The exact nature of a corporation has long been a subject of 
theoretical discussion. Today, however, it becomes a matter of 
practical importance as well. The reason for its emergence from the 
academic field is bound up with the tremendous development of the 
corporation as an engine of finance and as an instrument of economic 
organization.21 
Incident to this has come a radical change in the popular conception 
of the relationship between management and stockholders. Mr. Owen 
Young was able to say recently that The General Electric Company 
owed its first duty to its labor, its next to the public it served, and its 
                                                     
 16. Id. at 18. 
 17. Id. at 22. 
 18. Id. at 26. 
 19. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality 
(With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 
(2001) (questioning modern corporate objectives). 
 20. See Laurence D. Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose (2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/J5N2-
EDTE]. 
 21. BERLE, supra note 1, at 1. 
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third obligation in rank to its stockholders. A few years ago this 
would have been high socialism.22 
Only by a close study of the business mechanism, the expectations of 
the parties, the business standards involved and the respective 
positions of the various parties in the situation, can we undertake to 
indicate the result which the law should strive to reach.23 
In every new financial form, accordingly, it becomes necessary not 
merely to consider the draftsmanship of the papers, but also the 
possible results of any relations which may have been created.24 
4. SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM OWNERSHIP 
At several points in Corporation Finance, Berle echoes Chief Justice 
Leo Strine’s insights about the agency cost problems that arose, and arise, 
from the disintermediation of individual savings through various 
institutions, a problem Strine has labeled the “separation of ‘ownership 
from ownership.’”25 Berle was particularly concerned about how these 
kinds of agency cost problems arose with respect to investment bankers as 
intermediaries. Berle’s nostalgic descriptions of individual businesspeople 
resembles Chief Justice Strine’s descriptions of the importance of 
remembering the role of individuals as the source of savings.26 
The individual shareholder may at once be eliminated from the 
discussion as a means of control. . . . There are, however, three 
distinct influences which can be brought into play. The first is the 
group of investment bankers. . . . A second instrumentality is found 
in the stock exchanges. . . . A third safeguard lies further in the future, 
though it is already forecast by present developments. This is the 
interposition between the corporate management and the 
stockholders of depositaries capable of protecting the stockholders’ 
rights.27 
[N]o one who saves money can altogether escape putting himself in 
the situation of the investor. He is, in a sense, an enforced investor. 
In large measure, his savings must necessarily go into the channels 
                                                     
 22. Id. at 1. 
 23. Id. at 193. 
 24. Id. at 194. 
 25. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Why Excessive Risk-Taking Is Not Unexpected, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 5, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/dealbook-dialogue-leo-strine/ 
[https://perma.cc/624R-AUZM] (using the phrase “separation of ‘ownership from ownership’” to 
describe investor intermediary conflicts); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary 
Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 449 (2014). 
 26. Strine, Why Excessive Risk-Taking Is Not Unexpected, supra note 25. 
 27. BERLE, supra note 1, at 37–38. 
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of corporation finance. They may not travel this path directly. They 
may find their way into the system through the medium of insurance 
companies, investment trusts, commercial banks, or even savings 
banks. But this merely removes the problem one step from the person 
actually saving a few hundred dollars to the institution to whom he 
entrusts these savings.28 
It is still possible for a man to own a corner grocery store or a small 
haberdashery shop, but even these are rapidly being replaced by chain 
stores owned by large corporate entities. . . . The personally owned 
business is becoming a thing of the past. It is possible for a man of 
means to own privately his town house, his country house, his 
clothing and his personal effects, his automobiles, and property 
designed for his personal necessities and pleasures. But his funds put 
out to economic uses almost of necessity find their way, through the 
medium of investment bankers, into the capital structure of 
corporations.29 
5. INNOVATION IN FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
In several different chapters of Corporation Finance, and in several 
different contexts, Berle presaged various financial innovations, including 
the separation of rights in venture capital contracting and a range of 
corporate capital structure innovations.30 Berle described examples of the 
potential tension among various types of preferred stock in ways that 
resonate today.31 Berle ultimately advocated judicial intervention to 
address a range of innovations, a solution the Delaware courts have 
occasionally embraced but also have rejected.32 
Another of the management powers over individual stockholders’ 
rights is found in control of accounting. . . . If the board determines 
that all earnings should be conserved so that the class B shares may 
ultimately obtain a larger participation at the expense of class A, they 
have power to do this by simply increasing depreciation charges, or 
                                                     
 28. Id. at 191. 
 29. Id. at 26. 
 30. For a description of a range of these innovations, as well as the extant judicial approaches, 
including Delaware’s, see Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L. 
REV. 599 (2000). 
 31. For example, Chancellor Allen addressed such tensions in the context of a dispute between 
preferred and common shareholders. See Equity-Linked Inv’rs, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. 
Ch. 1997). 
 32. For example, the Delaware courts have considered the extent to which fiduciary duties and 
standing in litigation might shift from shareholders to creditors when a corporation is in the vicinity 
of insolvency. See Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004); Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 30, 1991). 
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what not, with the result that the annual statement shows a 
deficiency.33 
Powers granted to boards of directors are manifestly granted for use 
in forwarding the general interests of the corporation and of all 
classes of stock. This is implicit in the entire corporate mechanism. 
Use of any such power, not in the corporate interest and the general 
interest of all concerned, but for the purpose of benefiting one class 
of stock at the expense of another, obviously transcends the intended 
scope of the power. It is, further, probably an abuse of discretion by 
the directors.34 
Essentially such securities are hybrid, bridging a gap between 
preferred and common stocks, and having some of the dividend rights 
inherent in both. . . . There may be, of course, endless permutations.35 
Examination of the nature of rights in surplus arising upon creation 
of non-participating preferred stock and subsequent earning of 
surplus may show a single preference—that of the initial preferred 
dividend—or it may show a series of preferences . . . . So far as the 
writer is aware, this interpretation of the relation of various priorities 
of participating preferred stock is novel.36 
Neither a convertible obligation nor a stock purchase warrant, as 
such, gives the holder an equitable right in shares of stock. Such 
instruments create no trust in respect of any reserved shares; nor do 
they place the holder in a position to enforce any of the rights of a 
shareholder. All of the incidents of the situation must be worked out 
on simple lines of contract.37 
The fact that the conversion privilege uses a name which is applicable 
to the shares both before and after the splitting-up process, can hardly 
be construed to give the obligor corporation liberty to evade its 
promise by completely altering the unit value of the share.38 
It is sufficiently obvious that the practice of issuing convertible 
obligations and stock purchase warrants is still in its infancy.39 
It is practically undisputed that where the corporation is insolvent, 
the bondholder may apply to a court of equity to enjoin 
misapplication of corporate funds . . . . It is loosely stated that in such 
a situation the corporate management has become a trustee for the 
                                                     
 33. BERLE, supra note 1, at 33–34. 
 34. Id. at 110. 
 35. Id. at 112–13. 
 36. Id. at 126 & n.11. 
 37. Id. at 134. 
 38. Id. at 139. 
 39. Id. at 152. 
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benefit of creditors. This, however, is of little help; it is useless to 
lock the stable door after the horse has gone. It has also been held, 
however, that even prior to insolvency a bondholder may secure relief 
in equity against transactions by the corporate management 
constituting a ‘waste’ of the corporate assets . . . .40 
Theoretically, there is a wide difference between a stockholder and a 
bondholder. In practice and as a matter of finance, the difference is 
not nearly as great as that which the law presupposes. . . . Every 
banker knows this; there is no reason why courts should ignore it. It 
is true that the obligation-holder has bargained for and obtained 
certain rights . . . . In practice, however, these do not greatly alter the 
situation. Ultimately, the only protection which most bondholders 
have is the faithful management of the enterprise; and they stand in 
only slightly better position than a preferred stockholder.41 
[I]n exploring the somewhat amorphous field of corporation finance 
our search must be for relationships and their incidents. . . . [A] 
bondholder is a creditor . . . [b]ut he may also have a relationship to 
the management—specially if the corporation is on the brink of 
insolvency. A preferred stockholder has a charter clause governing 
his rights; but he also has a relation to the management which may 
entail additional duties of fidelity and fair dealing. Both of these may 
have a relationship with an investment banking house . . . . A holder 
of common stock . . . may have a different relationship to all three.42 
6. ANONYMOUS TRADING CHALLENGES 
Berle was not only concerned about the separation of rights in 
venture capital contracting and a range of corporate capital structure 
innovations, he was also concerned about insider trading. Berle’s 
assessment of insider trading was far more sympathetic to uninformed 
traders than scholarly assessments today; unlike other aspects of 
Corporation Finance, his statements about insider trading are worth 
recalling simply to note how the modern treatment of insider trading as 
connected to fiduciary duty breaches was far from preordained in 1928.43 
Berle considered the challenges associated with the fact that trading 
was increasingly anonymous, a puzzling aspect of 1920s markets, and 
addressed questions about when disclosure by insiders of facts should be 
required. He ultimately settled on three basic propositions. His description 
of the direct obligation between insiders and shareholders is interesting, as 
                                                     
 40. Id. at 160. 
 41. Id. at 156. 
 42. Id. at 192. 
 43. For a collection of leading articles tracing this evolution of insider trading law, see generally 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading, 36 J. CORP. L. 282 (2011). 
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his early recognition of what is now known as the “bespeaks caution” 
doctrine and the safe harbor for forward-looking statements.44 For 
example, just as these doctrines provide for a lower level of mandatory 
disclosure for opinions about the future, Berle noted that disclosures at the 
time were mandated only with respect to facts, not opinions about the 
future. Berle’s three propositions were: 
(1) The fiduciary obligation of officers and directors creates 
obligations not only to the corporation but to the stockholders 
directly.45 
(2) Where a director buys or sells stock in his own corporation, he is 
liable to the seller or buyer for losses sustained where disclosure of 
facts sufficient to form a fair basis of judgment as to the value of the 
stock has not been made by him or is not available through the 
ordinary channels of publicity by way of announcement, corporation 
report, or other recognized means of publicity.46 
(3) Requirement of disclosure has to do with facts only, and not with 
prospects, hopes or estimates.47 
7. EMERGENCE OF NON-VOTING STOCK 
The two eras during the past century when non-voting stock emerged 
as a significant phenomenon were in recent years (most prominently with 
the initial public offering of Snap Inc.) and during the mid-1920s. Scholars 
often cite to William Z. Ripley’s book, Main Street and Wall Street,48 as 
an authoritative source on non-voting stock; Corporation Finance relied 
on and cited Ripley’s earlier Atlantic Monthly article, from January 1926, 
with the same title. Many of the issues Berle addressed also have been 
addressed in the recent literature on non-voting stock.49 
As has been the case with recent securities issues, including the Snap 
initial public offering, Berle expressed concerns about the separation of 
voting and economic interests. Berle also noted the importance of financial 
intermediaries, which remain important today. 
                                                     
 44. For an analysis of how such disclosures, particularly risk factor disclosure, have evolved over 
time, see Karen K. Nelson & Adam C. Pritchard, Carrot or Stick?: The Shift from Voluntary to 
Mandatory Disclosure of Risk Factors, 13 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 266 (2016). 
 45. BERLE, supra note 1, at 181. 
 46. Id. at 183. 
 47. Id. at 181. 
 48. See generally WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927). 
 49. For a recent and provocative discussion of the Snap issuance, see Amy Westbrook & David 
A. Westbrook, Snapchat’s Gift: Equity Culture in High-Tech Firms (Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Law, 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-003, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3200415. 
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Non-voting stock, a relatively recent invention, was invoked (with 
other devices) in the case of the Goodyear Rubber Company to 
perpetuate control of that concern in the hands of a well-known firm 
of New York bankers. Transactions between the company and that 
firm and individual members of it were claimed to have resulted in 
private profits to the bankers. . . . [T]his litigation was settled out of 
court . . . .50 
The past few years have witnessed the rise of a new device, that of 
concentrating all corporate voting rights in a relatively small 
proportion of corporate stock. . . . Dangers attend this divorce of 
management from equitable interest. . . . Power without 
responsibility is, philosophically, a perilous matter.51 
The investment banking house is invariably in the center of a web of 
economic interests, to which it renders a real service and from which 
it derives a real return, but which afford possibilities for profitable 
transactions not necessarily benefiting the controlled corporations. 
While the banker’s action may be adequately regulated by a high 
sense of banking ethics which largely prevails among reputable 
houses, the law can hardly leave investors subject to the doubtful 
protection of private consciences.52 
8. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF SUBSIDIARIES 
Finally, Corporation Finance addressed in great detail the 
importance of subsidiaries. Although Berle is not explicitly discussing 
modern corporate structure, his discussion echoes its complexities, such 
as the complexities of the Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) that became 
infamous surrounding the collapse of Enron to large banks’ ongoing use 
of Variable Interest Entities, the successors to the SPEs.53 
Through the device of subsidiary companies all of these powers may 
be further enlarged. Should a corporation elect to transfer all its 
property to a subsidiary, taking in return stock of the subsidiary, it is 
in a position to control the entire action of the latter and thereby 
sanction almost any transaction into which the latter chooses to enter, 
quite irrespective of whether the original owner of the property is 
protected or not.54 
                                                     
 50. BERLE, supra note 1, at vi. 
 51. Id. at 42. 
 52. Id. at 44–45. 
 53. See Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisinger, What’s Inside America’s Banks?, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 
2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/whats-inside-americas-banks/309196/ 
[https://perma.cc/LX9B-34WH]. 
 54. BERLE, supra note 1, at 33. 
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The purely intracorporate relationships of management, creditors, 
and stockholders are sufficiently complex. When, however, one 
corporation is a holding company, owning or at least wielding a 
controlling interest in other corporations, the intricacies of the 
situation become extreme.55 
Under their cover the legitimate use of subsidiaries has been obscured 
by a too frequent manipulation of accounting and credit; so that 
lawyers, bankers, and courts are now faced with complicated 
structures in which the actual interests cannot readily be discerned.56 
Subsidiary corporations may be divided into two main classes: (a) 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, having no stock or obligations apart from 
that owned by the parent; (b) subsidiaries controlled by a parent 
corporation but having a financial structure at least partly 
independent from that of the parent.57 
The test, it is submitted, is a simple and absolute one. If a subsidiary 
incurs no debts on the strength of its own credit, and sells no 
securities, stocks, or bonds to anyone other than the parent, it falls 
within the first class. It then becomes, virtually, a bookkeeping 
division of the parent. Such subsidiaries present few problems apart 
from accountancy.58 
If, however, the subsidiary borrows money or incurs liability on its 
own credit-offers securities based on its own enterprise apart from 
that of its parent, or has a minority stock interest outstanding in the 
hands of persons whose hope of repayment or profit is limited to the 
success of the subsidiary enterprise-then it falls within the second 
class, and different rules must be applied.59 
It must be conceded that this division may not be plainly marked: a 
wholly owned subsidiary may incur liabilities to, say, its officers. But 
the fundamental distinction remains accurate though sometimes 
difficult of application. If its obligees look to the credit of the parent 
as their primary motivation, the subsidiary remains a mere 
bookkeeping convenience. If they look to the subsidiary itself, the 
situation is different.60 
If the X corporation has ninety per cent of the stock of the Y 
corporation, the holder of the remaining ten per cent can (if he be a 
true outsider and not in fact a dummy for the parent 
company . . . insist that the affairs of the subsidiary be run precisely 
                                                     
 55. Id. at 153. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 154. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 154–55. 
 60. Id. at 155. 
2019] Everything Old Is New Again 511 
as though it were independent. . . . The advent of the independent 
outsider, however, prevents either the parent or a judge sitting in 
equity from treating the subsidiary in this summary fashion.61 
Only by evolving rules which will adequately maintain the integrity 
of each unit in the chain can the subsidiary device be made 
safe . . . . The investing public is vitally interested in such rules; and 
they are, it is believed, sufficiently developed and sufficiently 
flexible to deal with the situation. The principal requirement is that 
they be clearly stated and clearly understood.62 
Berle saw an issue that prevails to this day: companies using 
subsidiaries as “bookkeeping ventures.” In order to protect the investing 
public, Berle argued that we need to look at the rules involving subsidiaries 
and insure those rules “maintain the integrity of each unit in the chain.” 
CONCLUSION 
The wisdom of Berle’s Corporation Finance was its recognition of 
two key ideas. First, the analysis of corporate rights requires that one 
explore the details regarding the relationships among corporate 
participants; Berle criticized simplistic views of the corporation and its 
actors. Second, shareholder rights, particularly voting rights, can be of 
limited utility, particularly in large public corporations. These two insights 
undergird the arguments that emerged four years later in Berle and 
Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932), and the 
broader notions of separation of ownership and control that have resonated 
so broadly since then. 
Given the approach that I have followed here, I think the most 
appropriate way to reinforce these final observations is with two excerpts 
from Corporation Finance, one from near the beginning and one from near 
the end. As with all of the excerpts above, Berle is prescient about the 
issues that corporate law scholars confront today. 
Yet modern finance rests precisely on the safety and certainty of these 
intra-corporate rights; and the economic importance of the position 
of the stockholder with respect to his management and the enterprise 
in which he shares is vastly greater than the matter of the relation of 
the corporation to the state.63 
                                                     
 61. Id. at 169–70. 
 62. Id. at 175. 
 63. Id. at 2. 
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The fiction further is that the voting stock controls the election of the 
management. The fact, of course, is that in many, perhaps most, 
cases, the stockholders’ vote means precisely nothing.64 
My goal here has been to preserve Berle’s wisdom about various 
issues related to corporate finance. His essays are underappreciated and 
resonate today. 
                                                     
 64. Id. at 190. 
